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Abstract
This paper puts Search Frictions models under novel empirical scrutiny and tests their
ability to match empirical observations. To capture changing dynamics, we fit an extended
Bayesian time-varying parameter VAR to US labour market data from 1962–2016. Our
results show significant and important parameter change that is difficult to explain using
standard theoretical models. We find that the key transmission mechanism in the Search
Frictions model, a strong response of vacancies to productivity shocks, is not present in
the data. This raises issues for the extensive debate on unemployment volatility. Our
analysis uncovers that a shock to the cost of vacancy creation contributes substantially to
the variation in labour market variables; and that these results hold for more sophisticated
New Keynesian DSGE models.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models of the labour market look to explain cyclical, long-run, and secular
relationships among key variables; namely unemployment, job vacancies and wages. Search
and matching models, developed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000), are the workhorse of modern labour economics. This framework examines
the incentives of firms to post vacancies, how unemployed workers find a job match, and the
resulting wage of a successful job match. They also provide an explanation for the underly-
ing structural dynamics of the labour market, and historically, are successful in assessing the
welfare implications of labour market policies. Their success stems from their ability to match
key empirical regularities in the data, such as the negative link between unemployment and
vacancies.
In this paper, we subject the Search Frictions model to novel empirical scrutiny and docu-
ment several weaknesses. First, we find evidence of significant and important parameter change;
this results in changes in impulse responses for key variables that are difficult to explain using
standard theoretical models. Second, the key transmission mechanism embedded in the Search
Frictions model, a strong response of vacancies to productivity shocks, leading to volatile move-
ments in unemployment across the business cycle, does not receive support through the lens of
the productivity shocks identified using a time-varying parameter VAR with stochastic volatility.
In addition, we argue that a shock to the cost of posting a vacancy, explains a substantial
portion of the variance of unemployment, vacancies and wages. This shock, which has not
to date been much discussed in the literature, is more important than productivity or job
separation shocks in driving the data. We find that the Search Frictions model cannot explain
the impact of this shock, as the estimated impact on wages is much stronger than the model
would imply. We also conjecture that our results are not specific to the Search Frictions model,
but also apply to a New Keynesian DSGE model with Search Frictions. That model introduces
a wider menu of shocks, but these simulated responses to these additional shocks are also unable
to match our estimated responses.
One of the main drawbacks of the search and matching approach is that structural relation-
ships are assumed to be constant throughout time. A growing empirical literature using models
accounting for parameter and volatility variation within labour markets casts doubt on this
(see e.g. Benati and Lubik (2014); Mumtaz and Zanetti (2015); Guglielminetti and Pouragh-
dam (2017))1. These empirical models do not include the real wage in their specifications. We
build on this literature by fitting a time-varying parameter VAR model (TVP VAR) compris-
ing unemployment, vacancies, the real wage and productivity to US labour market data from
1952–2016.
We then use estimates from the TVP VAR to evaluate the central features of models with
Search Frictions in the labour market. Specifically, we assess the ability of the standard Search
Frictions model of Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) to
1Benati and Lubik (2014) find variation in the position and slope of the Beveridge Curve over time. Mumtaz
and Zanetti (2015) find substantial time-variation in the response of key variables to study the response of key
labour market variables to technology shocks. Guglielminetti and Pouraghdam (2017) find marked differences in
the job creation process over time.
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match our empirical results. To do this, we calibrate a simple Search Frictions model so that it
matches the estimated impulse response of unemployment to a productivity shock. If the model
is consistent with the data, it should also match the estimated responses of vacancies and wages
to the same shock. Our results provide striking evidence in favour of changes in key labour
market transmission mechanisms that are difficult to explain in the traditional Search Frictions
model. In particular, during the first half of our sample, the response of unemployment and
vacancies become larger, with no change in the behaviour of wages. Contrastingly, in the latter
half of our sample, there are periods when the response of wages becomes persistent and highly
sensitive, with no change in the responses of unemployment and vacancies.
Our evidence is pertinent to the extensive debate on unemployment volatility. Shimer (2005)
calibrates a Search Frictions model with Nash wage bargaining and shows that it is unable to
replicate the large volatility of unemployment in the data. His conjecture is that this is due to
the response of wages to shocks dampening vacancy creation. In response, a large literature (eg,
Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hall and Milgrom (2008)) develops alternative
models that reduce the impact of labour market conditions on the wage and allows the impact of
the shock to largely fall on vacancy creation. This enables the model to generate a large volatility
of unemployment. These models have two testable features. First, a productivity shock leads
to a large surge in vacancy creation and hence a reduction in unemployment. Second, since
a stronger response of unemployment requires a more stable wage rate, a negative correlation
between unemployment volatility and wage volatility arises.
The empirical analysis we conduct suggests neither of the above receives empirical support2.
More specifically, we uncover that the relatively stronger response of vacancies to productivity
shocks during the first half compared to the latter half of our sample is due to changing shock
sizes. At no point do we observe the large surge of vacancy creation as the Shimer hypothesis
indicates. Furthermore, our empirical estimates permit a direct test on the correlation between
unemployment and wage variability using time-varying volatilities. These indicate that the
negative link between unemployment and wage volatility is present only during the 1970s and
1980s; with strong positive correlations in the other decades.
Another key finding from our empirical work is the economic importance of vacancy cost
shocks. A summary on the economic importance of structural shocks is as follows: First pro-
ductivity shocks explain 20-40% of the volatility in key labour variables. Second job separation
shocks explain no more than 10-20% of the variance in our variables. The current literature
stresses the importance of productivity and job separations shocks in driving the business cycle
in Search Frictions models. Our evidence suggests that these shocks explain, at best, half of the
overall variation in US labour market variables throughout our sample. Our analysis reveals
that a shock to the cost of vacancy creation is more important than these shocks. It explains
2Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) argue that the ability of Search Frictions models to generate a large volatility
of unemployment requires the resources devoted to vacancy creation to be relatively small (a low “fundamental
surplus”). This argument implies that a large surge in vacancies following a productivity shock is central to
Search Frictions models. But it also implies that some types of Search Frictions model do not require a negative
relationship between unemployment and wage volatility in order to generate unemployment volatility, as other
factors, for example costs of acquiring credit (Wasmer and Weil (2004)), can also lead to a small fundamental
surplus. But in the absence of these other factors, the negative relationship is necessary for the generation of a
large unemployment volatility.
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around 40-60% of the variance of unemployment, vacancies and wages. Thereby indicating that
this is an important, and neglected, source of movements in key labour market variables. Our
calibrations also show that the Search Frictions model is unable to match our empirical results.
In particular, the response of wages to this shock is much larger than implied by the Search
Frictions model
We postulate that the results and conclusions we report within this paper are also applicable
to New Keynesian DSGE models with Search Frictions in labour markets (see e.g. Thomas
(2008), Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011). In these models, shocks to
aggregate demand and monetary policy have the same impact on our variables as a productivity
shock, as they can also increase vacancies and wages and reduce unemployment. We therefore
simulate the impact of aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks in a New Keynesian
DSGE model with labour market Search Frictions, and compare these responses to our empirical
impulse responses. We find simulations are unable to not match our empirical estimates. As
a result, the inability of the Search Frictions model to match our empricial impulse response
functions also applies to the New Keynesian DSGE model.
The immediate implications of this paper for policy makers and researchers are twofold:
first, the stark change in unemployment volatility suggests that business cycles are increasingly
affecting those in current employment. The implication here is a shift in policy focus toward
stabilising their incomes. Our analysis demonstrates that policymakers should focus on costs of
vacancy creation in order to understand key variation in key labour market indicators. Second,
in light of the inability of Search Frictions in macroeconomic models to reconcile empirical ob-
servations, we may need to refine key characteristics of the labour market in order to understand
structural change.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes data and
outlines the econometric model; Section 3 presents reduced form results. In Section 4, we
explain how we identify structural shocks and present our structural estimates. Section 5
outlines our theoretical Search Frictions model, present our results on the fit between estimated
and simulated impulse responses and draws conclusions from these. Section 6 concludes and
outlines areas for future research.
2 Data Description and Econometric Model
We use quarterly US data from 1952 to 2016, a period that contains 10 NBER recessions, en-
suring that we are able to detect business cycle effects. Our choice of sample is entirely driven
by available data, since the vacancy data in Barnichon (2010a) ends in December 2016. Our
measure of US productivity is constructed by dividing data on GDP, drawn from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis database, by a measure of total hours worked collected by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS); see Hall (2007) for a discussion of why output per worker hour is
the appropriate measure of productivity in this context. We use data on unemployment, again
collected by the BLS. For vacancies, we use the composite Help Wanted index proposed by Bar-
nichon (2010a). For real wages, we take the logarithmic difference between the “Compensation
Per Hour of the Nonfarm Business Sector”taken from the FRED Economic Database, and the
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US Consumer Price Index 3. Labour productivity and real wages are converted into annual
growth rates as 100 multiplied by the logarithmic difference of each respective series. We plot
our US labour market data in Figure 1.
This study works with the following TVP VAR model with p = 2 lags and N = 4 variables:
Yt = β0,t + β1,tYt−1 + · · ·+ βp,tYt−2 + t ≡ X ′tθt + t (1)
where Yt ≡ [yt, vt, ut, wt]
′
is a vector of endogenous variables. Here yt is labour productivity,
vt is the vacancy rate, ut is the unemployment rate, and wt is real wages. X
′
t contains lagged
values of Yt and a constant. The VAR’s time-varying parameters are collected in θt and evolve
as
p(θt|θt−1, Q) = I(θt)f(θt|θt−1, Qt) (2)
where I(θt) is an indicator function that rejects unstable draws, thereby imposing a stability
constraint on the VAR where, conditional on the roots of the VAR polynomial lying outside
the unit circle, f(θt|θt−1, Qt) follows a random walk. Adding an indicator function that rejects
draws for the coefficient matrices in every t truncates and renormalises the prior. This stability
constraint imposes a belief, a priori, that explosive representations of the model are implausible.
θt = θt−1 + γt (3)
with γt ≡ [γ1,t, : γ2,t, ..., : γN ·(Np+1),t]′, where γt v N(0, Qt). Qt is diagonal, and collecting these
elements in the vector qt ≡ [q1,t, : q2,t, ..., : qN ·(Np+1),t]′, they evolve as geometric random walks
ln qi,t = ln qi,t−1 + κt (4)
with κt v N(0, Zq). The innovations in (1) follow t v N(0,Ωt). Ωt is the time–varying
covariance matrix which is factored as
Ωt = A−1t Ht(A−1t )
′ (5)
with At being a lower triangular matrix with ones along the main diagonal, and the elements
below the diagonal contain the contemporaneous relations. Ht is a diagonal matrix containing
the stochastic volatility innovations. Collecting the diagonal elements of Ht and the non-unit
non-zero elements of At in the vectors ht ≡ [h1,t, : h2,t, ..., hN,t]′, αt ≡ [α21,t, : α31,t, . . . , αNN−1,t]′
respectively, they evolve as
ln hi,t = ln hi,t−1 + ηt (6)
αt = αt−1 + ζt (7)
3We have also computed an alternative wage series in by using “Compensation of Employees, Received:
Wages and Salary Disbursements”, scaled by labour force participation. Specifically, we use series A576RC1
(”Compensation of Employees, Received: Wages and Salary Disbursements”), taken from the FRED Economic
Database and scaled by the labour force participation, series CLF16OV. Real wages are then constructed as the
logarithmic difference between this and the Consumer Price Index.
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where ηt v N(0, Zh), and ζt v N(0, S). The innovations in the model are jointly Normal, and
the structural shocks, ψt are such that t ≡ A−1t H
1
2
t ψt. Similar to Primiceri (2005), S is a block
diagonal matrix that implies the non-zero and non-unit elements of At evolve independently.
The prior specification of our model are similar to Baumeister and Benati (2013). To calibrate
the initial conditions of the model, we use the point estimates of a time-invariant VAR model
estimated using the first 10 years of data. We estimate the model using Bayesian methods
allowing for 20,000 runs of the Gibbs sampler. Upon discarding the initial 10,000 iterations as
burn-in, we sample every 10th draw to reduce autocorrelation. Details of our prior specification,
and an outline of the posterior simulation algorithm is provided in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 1: US Macroeconomic data from 1952 to 2016
Notes: This figure plots quarterly growth rates of US macroeconomic data from 1952Q1–2016Q4. The
top left panel plots the annual growth rate of labour productivity, yt; the top right panel plots the
vacancy rate, vt; the bottom left panel plots the unemployment rate, ut; and the bottom right panel
plots the annual growth rate of real wages, wt. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
3 Reduced Form Results
Before presenting empirical results, it is necessary to evaluate the fit of our baseline model. We
use the Bayesian deviance information criterion (DIC) proposed in Spiegelhalter et al. (2002).
The DIC consists of two terms, one evaluating the fit of the model, and the other a penalty
term for model complexity. Specifically, the DIC is given by
DIC = D¯ + pD (8)
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where D¯ = −2E(ln L(Λi)), the measure of fit, is equal to minus two multiplied by the expected
value of the log likelihood evaluated over the draws of the MCMC, and pD = D¯ + 2 ln L(E(Λi)),
is the measure of model complexity; with ln L(E(Λi)) being the log likelihood evaluated at the
posterior mean of parameter draws. The lower the DIC, the better the model fit. For time-
varying coefficient VARs with stochastic volatility, the DIC is estimated using a particle filter
that evaluates the likelihood function to deal with the non-linear interaction of the stochastic
volatilities (Mumtaz and Sunder-Plassmann, 2013). Restricted variants of the time-varying
coefficient models include: a conventional Bayesian VAR; a time-invariant coefficient VAR with
stochastic volatility; and a time-varying coefficient VAR with constant covariance matrix45.
Table 1 reports the estimated DIC statistics, for competing models. It is clear that our time-
varying coefficient VAR model with stochastic volatility fit the data best; relative to restricted
variants. Based on these results, we proceed by reporting results from our TVP VAR model6.
Table 1: Bayesian DIC Statistics for Competing VAR Models
Notes: This table reports the DIC statistics from a battery of competing Bayesian VAR models. The
row highlighted in bold font indicates the model with the lowest DIC, and therefore the model that best
fits the data.
DIC
TVP VAR time-varying covariance matrix 67.66
TVP VAR constant covariance matrix 807.42
Bayesian VAR stochastic volatility 411.5
Linear Bayesian VAR 865.53
The upper panel of Figure 2 plots the posterior median and 80% highest posterior den-
sity intervals for the logarithmic determinant of the time-varying covariance matrices. As in
Guglielminetti and Pouraghdam (2017), this proxies total prediction variation in the model, and
is characterised as the amount of ‘noise hitting the system’. This increases from the mid-1960s
to a peak in the early 1980s. It then falls sharply before rising again in recent years. This
pattern is reflected in the stochastic volatilities of US labour market variables, presented in the
lower panel of Figure 2. The volatilities of productivity growth and vacancies fall in the early
1980s and account for the fall in the overall volatility in our model in that period. By contrast,
the volatility of wages is gradually increasing throughout our sample, especially in the post-2008
period; this accounts for the increase in the estimated overall volatility in recent years7.
4These models were all estimated with standard priors within the literature. In particular, BVARs were
estimated with a Minnesota prior on the coefficients, models with constant covariance matrices were assumed
to have inverse-Wishart priors (see e.g. Koop and Korobilis (2010)), and those with time-varying parameters or
stochastic volatility were estimated using analogous priors to the time-varying coefficient VAR models as outlined
in the Appendix.
5We choose restricted variants of our extended TVP VAR as we do not wish to presume that periods of
economic boom and recession can be represented by just two (or possibly three) sets of parameters; like regime-
switching models impose.
6Available on request are results from estimated rolling VAR models. The dynamics of reduced form results
from these simple rolling VARs are consistent with those provided in the main text.
7Reduced form volatilities have been investigated in the previous literature, although with different specifica-
tions of the VAR. Our estimate of overall model volatility and the volatility of vacancies is similar to Guglielminetti
and Pouraghdam (2017). Our estimated volatility of unemployment is more stable than Mumtaz and Zanetti
(2015). The previous literature has not modelled wages or productivity growth.
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Figure 2: Total Prediction Variation, ln|Ωt|T |, and Stochastic Volatilities of US Labour
Market Variables from 1962 to 2016
Notes: The upper panel plots the posterior median, and 80% posterior credible intervals of logarithmic
determinant of the time-varying reduced-form covariance matrices, ln|Ωt|T |, from 1962Q1–2016Q4. The
lower panel plots the posterior median, and 80% posterior credible intervals of the reduced-from stochastic
volatility innovations of labour productivity growth, yt (top left panel); the vacancy rate, vt (top right
panel); the unemployment rate, ut (bottom left panel); and real wage growth, wt (bottom right panel)
from 1962Q1–2016Q4. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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In Figure 3, we report the time-varying pairwise correlations between our variables. Note
that our model is able to reproduce the switch in the correlation between productivity growth
and unemployment growth from negative to positive in the early-1980s that was first shown
by Barnichon (2010b). By contrast, there is no switch in the correlation between productivity
growth and vacancies growth. The Beveridge Curve correlation between vacancies and unem-
ployment is negative throughout our sample; yet varies markedly. In particular the Beveridge
Curve correlation is highly negative in late 1960s to the early 1980s, but substantially muted
thereafter. This switch in correlation may indicate that productivity shocks are not a major
driving force of labour market dynamics, since these shocks imply a negative relationship be-
tween productivity and unemployment. The correlations between wages and the other variables
in the model are small and never significant. The lack of correlation between the real wage and
the other variables suggests that labour market conditions may not have had a strong impact
on the real wage. It also suggests that the increase in wage volatility since 1980s has been
independent of the other variables and so the Search Frictions framework may be unable to
explain this increased volatility.
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Figure 3: Reduced-form correlations from 1962 to 2016
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median, and 80% posterior credible intervals of the reduced-from
model implied correlations of variables within the TVP VAR model from 1962Q1–2016Q4. ρˆit,jt denotes
the model implied correlation of variable i and j at time t respectively. yt, vt, ut, wt denote labour
productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, and real wage growth, respectively. Grey
bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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4 Structural Analysis
We partially identify the structural model using contemporaneous sign restrictions following a
variant of Algorithm 1 in Arias et al. (2018). Following Arias et al. (2018) and Rubio-Ramirez
et al. (2010), the time-varying structural impact matrix, A0,t is calculated in the following
manner. Given the current state of the economy, take the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
of the VAR’s time-varying covariance matrix at time t, Ωt = PtDtP ′t . Draw an N ×N matrix
K from the N(0, 1) distribution and compute the QR decomposition of K, normalising the
elements of the diagonal matrix R to be positive; the matrix Q is a matrix whose columns
are orthogonal to one another. The time-varying structural impact matrix is computed as
A0,t = PtD
1
2
t Q
′. Given A0,t, compute the reduced-form innovations using t = A0,tψt, where
ψt contains the structural shocks obtained by drawing from a standard Normal distribution.
Further details on generalised impulse response computation are in the Online Appendix.
Table 2 presents our sign restrictions. We identify: a productivity shock, ψProdt ; a job
separation shock, ψJSt ; and a vacancy cost shock, ψ
γ
t .
Table 2: Contemporaneous Impact of Identified Shocks on Labour Market Variables
Notes: This table shows the contemporaneous sign restrictions imposed on variable x = {yt, vt, ut, wt}
to a productivity shock, ψProdt ; a job separation shock, ψJSt ; and a shock to the cost of posting a vacancy,
ψγt , respectively. yt is the annual growth rate of labour productivity; vt is the vacancy rate; ut is the
unemployment rate; and wt is the annual growth in real wages. x denotes no restriction.
yt vt ut wt
ψProdt ≥ ≥ ≤ ≥
ψJSt x ≥ ≥ ≤
ψγt x ≤ ≥ ≥
These restrictions are consistent with a simple Search Frictions model8. A positive produc-
tivity shock increases the value of a productive job match; this leads firms to post increased
vacancies. This results in more job matches and so unemployment falls; therefore the wage
increases9. A positive shock to the job separation rate will shift out the Beveridge Curve, in-
creasing unemployment and vacancies. It will also reduce the surplus from a job match as the
match is more likely to dissolve; this leads to a lower real wage. We interpret the third shock
as a shock to the cost of posting a vacancy10. A positive shock to the cost of posting a vacancy
will reduce vacancy posting, leading to an increase in unemployment. The effect on the wage is
ambiguous. There are offsetting effects on the real wage, since the reduction in labour market
tightness reduces the wage but the raises the cost if hiring a replacement worker, increasing
the surplus from a filled job match. Using standard calibrations of structural parameters, the
second effect dominates which leads us to impose an increase in wages on impact.
8As we discuss below, a New Keynesian DSGE model with Search Frictions in the labour market would imply
similar restrictions, although with a richer menu of structural shocks
9The most widely-used forms of wage determination in the literature are either worker-firm Nash bargaining
or the alternating offer bargaining protocol of Hall and Milgrom (2008). In either case, a positive productivity
shock will increase the wage.
10Shocks to the opportunity cost of employment, or to the bargaining power of workers in a model with Nash
bargaining over wages, will have similar effects.
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Figure 4 presents structural shock volatility. We can see that the volatilities of productivity
and vacancy cost shocks are larger than the volatility of job separation shocks. Their evolution
also tracks the evolution of the Total Prediction Variation more closely. More notably, we
observe a break in the volatility of productivity and vacancy cost shocks from the early 1980s.
This is consistent with the reduction in the stochastic volatilities of unemployment and vacancies
in Figure 2. Over the past two decades, the volatility of job separation shock is slowly rising,
whilst the volatility of productivity and vacancy cost shock volatility are relatively flat.
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Figure 4: Volatility of Structural Productivity and Job Separation Shocks from 1962
to 2016
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median and 80% equal-tailed point-wise posterior probability bands
for the volatility of identified productivity and job separations shocks from 1962Q1–2016Q4. Grey bars
indicate NBER recession dates.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 report impulse response functions of US labour market variables with
respect to a one standard deviation productivity shock; job separations shock; and vacancy cost
shock respectively. The top four quadrants in each figure present the posterior median response
of variables throughout time and over a 20 quarter horizon. The bottom four quadrants allow us
to assess the statistical credibility of shocks by plotting the posterior median and 80% posterior
credible intervals of the response of variables to shocks 1 quarter following impact. We normalise
impulse response functions for productivity shocks to cause a 1% rise in labour productivity on
impact. We normalise the impulse response functions of job separations shocks and vacancy
11
cost shocks to cause the unemployment rate to rise by 1% on impact respectively.
Overall, it is clear that there is marked time-variation in the response of all variables to
these shocks. Four main findings emerge from these graphs. First, the cyclical responses
of unemployment and vacancies to all shocks are more prominent in the earlier years of our
sample. Productivity shocks during the 1970s and 1980s have notably stronger impacts on
unemployment and vacancy rates during recessionary periods in these decades. Then, coherent
with the Great Moderation, unemployment and vacancies become more resilient to these shocks
with no clear cyclical pattern. Second, unemployment and vacancies exhibit a relatively high
degree of persistence to all shocks. This is particularly prominent for job separation and vacancy
cost shocks which, from posterior median estimates lasts around 15 quarters. However, in terms
of absolute magnitude it is clear that the unemployment rate is more sensitive to productivity
and vacancy cost shocks relative to the vacancy rate. Third, wages become more sensitive to all
shocks from the Great Moderation to the end of our sample. Comparing the response of wages in
1962 and 2016, we see that the impact response almost doubles for all shocks. Fourth, there is a
loose relationship between wages and other labour market variables. For example, in the earlier
part of our sample, there are marked increases in the impulse response of unemployment and
vacancies to productivity shocks but no change in the impulse response of wages. By contrast,
in the latter part of our sample, there is a large and sustained increase in the impulse response
of wages but no changes in the impulse response of unemployment and vacancies. This loose
relationship corresponds well with the correlations we report in Figure 3.
In this section, we present novel results on the interactions between wages and unemployment
across the business cycle and how these interactions have evolved over time. These findings pose
fresh challenges for theoretical models. In the next section, we consider whether existing models
can explain these new results.
12
1965
1990
2016
10
20
0
1
P
er
ce
nt
yt
1965
1990
2016
10
20
0
0.2
vt
1965
1990
2016
10
20
−0.5
0
Time Horizon
P
er
ce
nt
ut
1965
1990
2016
10
20
0
1
2
Time Horizon
wt
1965 1990 2016
0.4
0.6
0.8
P
er
ce
nt
yt
1965 1990 2016
0.2
0.4
vt
1965 1990 2016
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
Time
P
er
ce
nt
ut
1965 1990 2016
1
2
3
Time
wt
Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions with Respect to a Productivity Shock from
1962 to 2016
Notes: The top four quadrants this figure plot the posterior median generalised impulse response func-
tions of US labour market data with respect to a one standard deviation productivity shock from 1962Q1
to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of labour productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the un-
employment rate, and real wage growth respectively. Impulse responses are computed for a 20 quarter
horizon and normalised such that the shock causes labour productivity to increase by 1%. The bottom
four quadrants of this figure report the posterior median and 80% equal-tailed point-wise posterior prob-
ability bands for the responses, at a 1 quarter horizon, of US labour market data with respect to a one
standard deviation productivity shock from 1962Q1 to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of
labour productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, and real wage growth respectively.
Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions with Respect to a Job Separation Shock from
1962 to 2016
Notes: The top four quadrants of this figure plots the posterior median generalised impulse response
functions of US labour market data with respect to a one standard deviation job separation shock from
1962Q1 to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of labour productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the
unemployment rate, and real wage growth respectively. Impulse responses are computed for a 20 quarter
horizon and normalised such that the shock causes unemployment to increase by 1%. The bottom four
quadrants of this figure report the posterior median and 80% equal-tailed point-wise posterior probability
bands for the responses, at a 1 quarter horizon, of US labour market data with respect to a one standard
deviation job separation shock from 1962Q1 to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of labour
productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, and real wage growth respectively. Grey
bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions with Respect to a Vacancy Cost Shock from
1962 to 2016
Notes: The top four quadrants this figure plot the posterior median generalised impulse response func-
tions of US labour market data with respect to a one standard deviation vacancy cost shock from 1962Q1
to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of labour productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the un-
employment rate, and real wage growth respectively. Impulse responses are computed for a 20 quarter
horizon and normalised such that the shock causes labour productivity to increase by 1%. The bottom
four quadrants of this figure report the posterior median and 80% equal-tailed point-wise posterior prob-
ability bands for the responses, at a 1 quarter horizon, of US labour market data with respect to a one
standard deviation productivity shock from 1962Q1 to 2016Q4. yt, vt, ut, wt denote the response of
labour productivity growth, the vacancy rate, the unemployment rate, and real wage growth respectively.
Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
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5 Can Theory Match the Evidence?
We now turn to theory in order to examine whether a standard Search Frictions model is
consistent with our empirical findings. We focus on the ability of the Search Frictions model to
match three things. First, our finding that unemployment is more responsive to productivity and
vacancy cost shocks than are vacancies. Second, the growing response of wages to a productivity
and vacancy cost shocks, with little change in the responses of unemployment and vacancies,
that we observe in the latter part of our sample. Third, the strong response of unemployment
to vacancy cost shocks. As we discuss below, these findings pose significant challenges to the
amplification mechanism embedded in the Search Frictions model.
To do this, we compare our empirical impulse responses at different dates with simulated
impulse responses from a simple Search Frictions model. We focus on the impulse responses in
1974Q2 and 2008Q4. These dates correspond to similar points on the business cycle and the
differences between the empirical impulse responses at these dates captures the marked changes
in the impulse responses for wages and the relatively mild changes in the impulse responses for
vacancies and unemployment in the second half of our sample as documented in Figures 5 and
7. To generate simulated impulse responses, we first calibrate a standard Search Frictions model
so that the simulated impulse responses for unemployment following a productivity shock and
a vacancy cost shock match the corresponding estimated impulse response function in 1974Q2.
Using this, we investigate whether this calibrated model can also match the estimated impulse
responses for vacancies and wages in 1974Q2. We then recalibrate the model to match the
estimated impulse response function for unemployment in 2008Q4; using this, we assess whether
the re-calibration enables the theoretical model to match changes in estimated impulse responses
for wages.
Before reporting those results, we briefly outline our Search Frictions model and explain
our calibration strategy. Our simple Search Frictions model is as follows. Aggregate hiring is
determined by the matching function ht = muαt v1−αt , where h is the number of workers hired,
u is unemployment and v are vacancies. m and α are parameters characterising the matching
function. Labour market tightness is θt = vtut . Existing job matches dissolve at the end of
the period with exogenous but time-varying probability τt; we assume that τt = τeε
τ
t where
ετt = ρτετt−1 + ητt where ητt is distributed as N(0, σ2τ ). There is a continuum of identical workers
on the unit interval. If unemployed, an individual finds a job and is employed in the next period
with endogenous probability f = hu . If employed, a worker earns w; if unemployed, they receive
the opportunity cost of employment z. There is a continuum of identical firms on the unit
interval. Each firm can hire up to one worker and a firm with an employed worker produces
yt = st, where st = eε
s
t ; we assume εst = ρsεst−1 + ηst where ηst is distributed as N(0, σ2s). Firms
must pay a real cost of γt to post a vacancy, where where γt = γeε
γ
t ; we assume εγt = ργε
γ
t−1+η
γ
t
where ηγt is distributed as N(0, σ2γ). Vacancies are then filled at the start of the next period
with endogenous probability q = hv . Wages are set through worker-firm Nash bargaining. The
cost of hiring a worker is λt = γt
(
(1+r)
qt
− (1−τt)Etqt+1
)
The model may be written in three simple relations; the evolution of unemployment given
by
1− ut = (1− τt)(1− ut−1) + ht (9)
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the job creation condition
yt = wt + λt (10)
and the wage
wt = (1− φ)z + φ(yt + γtθt) (11)
We summarise parameter values for calibration in Table 3. We normalize a time period to
be one month. We set r = 0.004, equivalent to an annual discount rate of 5%. We calibrate the
average monthly job separation rate as τ = 0.033. For the matching function, we set α = 0.5;
this is consistent with the range of estimates obtained by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The
opportunity cost of employment is z = 0.66; this is slightly below the value used by Hall and
Milgrom (2008) (z = 0.71) but is close to the mid-point of the range of alternative estimates
based on alternative specifications of the flow value of non-work reported by Chodorow-Reich
and Karabarbounis (2016), from z = 0.47 to z = 0.96. Worker bargaining power is set as
φ = 0.6.
Table 3: Parameter Values for Calibration: The Search Frictions Model
This table reports the values of the calibrations for 1974Q2 and 2008Q4.
Parameter Interpretation 1974Q2 2008Q4
τ Ave separation rate 0.033 0.033
r Discount rate 0.004 0.004
α Elasticity of matching function 0.50 0.50
b Opportunity cost of unemployment 0.66 0.53
γ Vacancy posting cost 0.42 0.33
m Matching coefficient 0.80 1.00
φ Bargaining power 0.60 0.87
ρs Persistence of productivity shock 0.878 0.878
σs Volatility of productivity shock 0.004 0.0037
ργ Persistence of vacancy cost shock 0.878 0.878
σγ Volatility of vacancy cost shock 0.003 0.003
We have two free parameters, m, matching efficiency, and γ, the average cost of posting
a vacancy. For 1974Q2, we calibrate these so that the steady-state of the model matches the
unemployment rate in 1974Q2 and the simulated impulse response for unemployment matches
its empirical counterparts; this gives m=0.8 and γ = 0.42. For 2008Q4, we re-calibrate the
efficiency of matching to m = 1 and the cost of posting a vacancy to γ = 0.325 to match the
different unemployment rate and different impulse response for unemployment in that period.
We also increase the worker’s bargaining power to φ = 0.87 and decrease the opportunity cost
of employment to z = 0.53. Doing so, we increase the response of wages to a productivity shock
without dampening the response of unemployment to a productivity shock. We calibrate the
the volatility and persistence of the productivity and vacancy cost shocks at each date to match
the estimated impulse response of unemployment to these shocks at each date; this gives σs = 1
in 1974Q2 and σs = 0.7 in 2008Q4. We also find that the calibrating ρs = 0.878, following
Shimer (2005), works well for both dates. For the vacancy cost shock, we use σγ = 0.3 and
ργ = 0.878 in both cases.
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Figure 8 contains our results. To highlight our arguments, we normalise estimated and
simulated impulse responses so that unemployment increases by 1 on impact in response to both
shocks. The responses of wages and vacancies therefore show the responses of these variables
relative to the response of unemployment.
5.1 Vacancies and Unemployment
We now focus on comparing how well impulse response functions from our Search Frictions
model track what we see in the data. We see in our empirical results that unemployment is
more responsive than vacancies to productivity and vacancy cost shocks. Figure 8 reveals that
the impulse responses of vacancies stemming from our TVP VAR are very different from their
simulated counterparts. It is clear that the vacancy rate in response to both shocks, and at
both dates, is 10 times larger from our calibrations relative to those from the empirical model.
In order to match the impulse response for unemployment in the Search Frictions model, a large
surge in vacancies is needed. Ultimately, this finding suggests that the amplification mechanism
in the Search Frictions model is absent in the data.
One might argue that this finding reflects the simplicity of the Search Frictions model we use
in this exercise. To assess this, we consider two extension of this model; a model with endogenous
separations and a model with vacancy dynamics. To model endogenous separations, we use the
model in Chapter 2 of Pissarides (2000). Productivity is idiosyncratic, described by a Poisson
process with arrival rate ς. Firms dismiss workers if the productivity of a job match is below
a reservation level given by R = 1 − γ(r+ς)(1−φ)q(θ) . This model enables a productivity shock to
affect the inflow to and outflow from unemployment, whereas the simple model used above only
allows shocks to affect the outflow. Introducing this additional channel implies that a positive
productivity shock reduces the inflow to unemployment through endogenous separations; a
smaller surge in vacancies is therefore required to match the empirical impulse response for
unemployment11. As a result, the impulse response for vacancies following a productivity shock
is therefore more consistent with the estimated response.
However a model with endogenous separations is unable to capture the estimated impulse
response functions to a vacancy cost shock. A shock that increases the cost of posting a
vacancy will decrease reservation productivity and therefore reduce the endogenous inflow into
unemployment12. As a result, a stronger reduction is vacancies is required to match the empirical
impulse response for unemployment; this widens the gap between the empirical and simulated
impulse response functions for vacancies following a vacancy cost shock.
The empirical impulse response functions for vacancies in Figure 8 display ‘hump-shaped”
responses, similar to that for unemployment. This suggests the presence of stock-flow effects;
these arise if not all unfilled vacancies are destroyed at the end of a period. Fujita and Ramey
(2007), Leduc and Liu (2016) and Coles and Moghaddasi-Kelishomi (2018) develop models in
which some matching opportunities persistent beyond the end of each period, so not all unfilled
vacancies are immediately destroyed. This introduces dynamics for vacancies similar to that for
11A positive productivity shock increases labour market tightness and so reduces the vacancy filling rate. This
reduces reservation productivity and so reduces the endogenous inflow.
12An increase in vacancy cost will also affect the reservation productivity through the vacancy filling rate.
However the direct impact dominates so the reservation productivity will decrease.
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unemployment. We calibrate these alternative Search Frictions models to examine whether they
provide a better match to our estimated impulse responses; results are available upon request.
Our results from alternative calibrations are qualitatively similar to those we present in the main
text. Although this approach is better able to capture the initial increase in vacancies following
a productivity shock, the match between estimated and simulated responses to a productivity
shock is generally worse, while the responses to a job separations shock are no closer13.
5.2 Wages and Unemployment
Our empirical evidence on the changing relationships between wages and unemployment presents
issues for the Search Frictions model. In what follows, we explore three of these. First, the
simulated impulse responses of wages to productivity and vacancy cost shocks in Figure 8 differ
markedly from estimated responses, especially for vacancy cost shocks. Second, there has been
an increasing impulse response of wages to productivity and vacancy cost shocks since 1980s that
has occurred without any reduction in the impulse response of unemployment to those shocks.
And third, there is a positive correlation between unemployment volatility and wage volatility.
Table 4 documents the correlations between the volatilities of wages and unemployment, in the
using the full sample of 1962Q1–2016Q4; between earlier and later halves of the sample in half;
and across decades. There is a strong positive correlation between unemployment and wage
volatility in most of our sample periods.
Table 4: Model-Implied Correlations between Unemployment and Wage Volatility
Notes: This table reports contemporaneous correlations between the posterior median stochastic volatil-
ity estimates of unemployment and wage volatility, ρˆ(σut , σwt ) . The table reports correlations by decade,
a sample split, and using the full sample of 1962Q1–2016Q4
Sample ρˆ(σut , σwt ) Sample ρˆ(σut , σwt )
1962Q1-1969Q4 0.84 1990Q1-1999Q4 0.33
1970Q1-1979Q4 -0.89 2000Q1-2009Q4 0.97
1980Q1-1989Q4 -0.91 2010Q1-2016Q4 0.76
1962Q1-1989Q2 0.11 1989Q3-2016Q4 0.87
1962Q1-2016Q4 0.34
Figure 8 shows that the simulated impulse responses of wages to productivity and vacancy
cost shocks are unable to match their estimated counterparts, at either date. This is because
we calibrate our model to match the estimated impulse response of unemployment to shocks.
In order to match the strong estimated response of unemployment to shocks, the model must
be calibrated to ensure a strong response of vacancies. This is the source of the vacancy surge
discussed above. But the consequence of this calibration is that the response of the wage does
not match the estimated response. This issue is especially acute for the impulse response for
13Coles and Moghaddasi-Kelishomi (2018) argue that the labour market is largely driven by job separation
shocks and the key amplification mechanism embedded in their model is a delayed response of vacancy creation
to these shocks. Our estimates are not supportive of a delayed response, as there is a strong response of vacancy
creation to job separation within a quarter, although this response does not peak until the second quarter.
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Figure 8: Estimated and Simulated Impulse Response Functions for Productivity
and Vacancy Cost Shocks: 1974Q2 and 2008Q4
Notes: This figure plots the impulse response function of vacancies, vt; unemployment, ut; and wages,
wt with respect to a productivity shock (LHS plots) and a vacancy cost shock respectively (RHS plots).
Solid lines represent the posterior median impulse response functions from the TVP VAR and dashed
lines stem from calibrations of our Search Frictions model. All impulse response functions are normalised
to generate a 1% increase in unemployment. Panel A uses impulse response functions from the TVP
VAR from 1974Q2 and the Search Frictions model uses data during this period for calibration. Panel B
uses impulse response functions in 2008Q4 and the Search Frictions model uses data during this period
for calibration.
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vacancy costs14. We further note that the simulations are not able to explain the increased
response of wages; this lack of match is, again, especially marked for vacancy cost shocks.
These findings are important as they relate to the large literature on unemployment volatility
puzzle. One of the more prominent proposed solutions to this puzzle is to introduce real wage
rigidity. The role of real wage rigidity in amplifying the impact of shocks on unemployment arises
because it has a strong and direct impact on resources available for vacancy creation, implied by
the job hiring condition in (10). Our results question the role of real wage rigidity as a source
of unemployment volatility15. This paper adds two important empirical observations to this
debate. First, we find a positive correlation between the volatilities of wages and unemployment
across most of our sample period. Second, the paper shows the estimated impulse response of
wages to a productivity shock has dramatically increased since early 2000 and is much stronger
than its simulated counterpart if the model is calibrated to match the impulse response of
unemployment. These findings are hard to reconcile with the view that unemployment volatility
is caused by low wage volatility.
Finally, we note that it is also difficult for Search Frictions model to capture the positive
correlation between unemployment and wage volatility. One might argue that a positive correla-
tion can be generated by a reduction in the profits of firms. But that would require a reduction
in profits across most of our sample period, and especially in the post-1990 period, when the
positive correlation is particularly strong. That does not seem plausible. Alternatively, one
might argue that changes in structural parameters such as the volatility of productivity can
give rise to a positive correlation. But this would require changes in these parameters across
our sample period, which also seems unlikely.
5.3 The Importance of Vacancy Cost Shocks
We now address whether vacancy cost shocks exhibit economic importance. Figure 9 shows
the posterior median estimate of the percent share of the overall forecast error variance of
unemployment, vacancies and wages attributable to productivity, job separation and vacancy
creation shocks at a 20 quarter horizon. Note that our structural shocks explain most of the
variance in our variables across our sample, and it is unlikely that a fourth structural shocks
would have a strong impact on our results. Productivity shocks make the largest contribution
to explaining the variance of vacancies in the early part of our sample, explaining 25-35%
of the variance, but have been declining to around 20% in recent decades. Vacancy costs
shocks explain around 25% of the variance; this contribution is stable across the sample. The
contribution of separations shocks is less than 20% at the start of the same but increases to 25%
in the post-2000 period. Vacancy costs shocks make the largest contribution to the variance
14We consider Nash bargained wage in our simulations. With this, a positive vacancy cost shock increases
cost of posting a vacancy but also decreases market tightness. These offsetting effects lead to a small increase
in the wage, so the simulated response fails to match the large estimated response. Alternative modes of wage
formation are unlikely to resolve this. For example, credible bargaining will lessen the impact of vacancy costs
and so widen the gap between simulated and estimated responses.
15The current debate is largely centred around the issue of whether the wages of new hires are more cyclical
than the aggregate wage (e.g. Pissarides (2009), Haefke et al. (2013) and Gertler et al. (2019)). The logic of
this debate is that if the wages of new hires are highly cyclical, then real wage rigidity is not the solution to
unemployment volatility puzzle.
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of unemployment, explaining around 40-50% across the sample. Productivity shocks explain
around 30-40% of the variance in the early part of the sample but then decline in importance.
Job separations never explain more than 10-15% of the variance. Vacancy cost shocks also
make the largest contribution to explaining the forecast error variance of wages, accounting
for 30-40% of the variance across the sample. Productivity and job separations shocks make a
smaller contribution, explaining 20-25% of the variance each.
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Figure 9: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions of Vacancies, Unemployment and
Wage Growth 1962 to 2016
Notes: This figure plots the posterior median, of the percent share of variance attributable, at a 20
quarter horizon, to productivity shocks (Red line); job separation shocks (Green line); and vacancy cost
shocks (Blue line) for: the vacancy rate, vt (LHS figure); the unemployment rate, ut (Central figure);
and real wage growth, wt (RHS figure) from 1962Q1–2016Q4. Grey bars indicate NBER recession dates.
One might question our interpretation of this shock that we identify as one that moves
unemployment and wages in the same direction and moves vacancies in the opposite direction.
In our simple Search Frictions model, shocks to the cost of posting vacancies have this affect.
However, one can rationalise that shocks to the opportunity cost of employment and to worker
bargaining power16. We feel our interpretation is reasonable for two reasons. First, vacancy
costs are important in all types of Search Frictions model, unlike the other candidate shocks. A
shock to bargaining power is not relevant in a model that does not have Nash wage bargaining,
and a shock to the opportunity cost of employment is not relevant in models where this is not
an important determinant of wages, for example models with wage posting. Second, one could
argue that vacancy cost shocks acts as a proxy for other shocks that are not captured by our
simple Search Frictions model. In a richer model, shocks to vacancy costs might reflect shocks to
the cost of capital (e.g., Wasmer and Weil (2004), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Eckstein
et al. (2019)) or financial shocks (e.g., Hall (2017) and Eckstein et al. (2019)).
We acknowledge that some may disagree, but for this paper the important question is
16Other models have alternative shocks that also satisfy this identification. For example, in the Credible
Bargaining model of Hall and Milgrom (2008), a shock to the cost of delaying in wage negotiations has the same
effect
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whether our interpretation of this shock as a shock to vacancy costs affects our results. To
assess this, we simulated the impact of shocks to the opportunity cost of employment and to
bargaining power. We followed the same approach as above; we used the calibrations in Table
4 and calibrated the volatilities of these shocks so that the simulated responses matched the
estimated responses of unemployment. Our key finding is unchanged; the response of the wage
to these shocks is small, similar to the response to a vacancy cost shock. None of the shocks
are able to match the large estimated response of wages to this shock. Therefore we posit that
our findings are robust to alternative interpretations of this shock.
5.4 Summary
Overall the we provide substantial evidence supporting the view that vacancy costs are more
important than productivity shocks in driving movement in the labour market across the busi-
ness cycle. Since there is little discussion of these shocks in the current literature, we conjecture
that further investigation of these shocks may be useful. Our results also imply that the em-
phasis on productivity shocks in most of the current literature is misplaced. They also suggest
that researchers may have been looking in the wrong place for a solution to the unemployment
volatility puzzle. This section has also shown that the Search Frictions model cannot match
the estimated responses of the labour market to productivity and vacancy cost shocks. This
suggests that some important amplification mechanism may be missing in the model.
5.5 The New Keynesian Model With Search Frictions
Naturally one questions whether our results and the implications hold New Keynesian models
with search frictions in labour markets (Thomas (2008), Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Ravenna
and Walsh (2011)). In comparison to the Search Frictions model, this approach permits a more
detailed analysis of aggregate demand. It also introduces a richer set of shocks, including
shocks to aggregate demand and monetary policy. The impact of these shocks is similar to the
impact of a productivity shock, since they also reduce unemployment and increase vacancies and
wages. We therefore simulated the impact of aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks,
to investigate whether these shocks can generate impulse responses similar to the estimated
impulse responses reported in Section 4 above.
To do this, we use a model similar to Ravenna and Walsh (2011). This model incorporates
labour search frictions and Nash bargaining over wages into a simple New Keynesian model.
We do not include wage rigidity17. The simulated impact of aggregate demand and monetary
policy shocks is similar to the impact of productivity shocks, reported in Figure 8. This result
is not surprising, as the New Keynesian model contains essentially the same model of the labour
market as the Search Frictions model. As a result, our arguments about the inability of the
Search Frictions model to match our estimated impulse response functions also applies to the
New Keynesian model.
17The model and simulations results are available on request
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper puts search and matching models, the workhorse of modern labour market marcoeco-
nomics, under novel empirical scrutiny. Using state-of-the-art Bayesian estimation techniques,
we fit an extended TVP VAR to US labour market data from 1962–2016. We depart from the
existing literature (see e.g. Yashiv (2006); Faccini et al. (2013); Hall (2005); Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008); Lubik (2009)) in two ways. First, we find that the search frictions model
overestimates the impact of job creation on the response of unemployment to productivity and
vacancy cost shocks. The data rejects the theoretical surge in vacancies in response to those two
shocks. Second, it is difficult for Search Frictions models to capture the estimated increasing
response of wages to productivity and vacancy cost shocks without dampening the response of
unemployment to those shocks. It is also difficult for Search Frictions models to capture the
positive correlation between unemployment and wage volatility. These findings question the
literature that uses wage rigidity to address the unemployment volatility puzzle. Finally, our
analysis highlights the economic importance of shocks to vacancy creation, which have been
overlooked in the literature. These play an important role in driving labour market dynamics
by explaining around 40-60% of variation in key variables.
Our conclusions hold for: i) alternative transformations of the data; ii) extensions of con-
ventional Search Frictions models; and iii) New Keynesian DSGE models with Search Frictions
within the labour market. With this in mind, the main implication of our findings is the call
for a refinement of search and matching models in order to match what we observe in the data.
We also note for policy makers that the stark change in unemployment volatility suggests that
business cycles are increasingly affecting those in current employment. The implication here is
a shift in policy focus toward stabilising their incomes. Our analysis demonstrates that policy
makers should focus on costs of vacancy creation in order to understand key variation in key
labour market indicators.
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